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Abstract
We analyze the implications of tourism activities on economic growth and environmental assets, focus-
ing especially on small island countries. We develop a stylized dynamic economic model where tourism is
the trigger of the incentive mechanism leading to abatement activities and economic growth. The basic
idea is that tourists choose the location to visit according to a number of factors (including environmental
quality) which are affected by residents’ choices. If residents engage in environmental protection activi-
ties, it then may be possible for environmental-based tourism economies to reach a smooth development
process. We show that the (sustainable) balanced growth path is the only viable equilibrium, and along
such a path consumption grows while environmental quality rises. Tourists’ preferences crucially affect
the long-run outcome, since economic and environmental growth rates increase with the green preference
and decrease with the grey preference and crowding aversion parameters. Thus, if tourism specialization
needs to be the pathway to development, green-tourism will need to be promoted.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, a slowly growing consensus on the fact that human activity is dramatically affecting
our planet climate, biological mix and natural resources has arisen. As a recognition of this, a huge body
of works analyzes the implications of social, demographic and economic activities on the environmental
and climatic changes the planet has been facing. In economics literature, much attention is placed on the
effects of economic development on natural assets, and in particular on the possibility that economic growth
and environmental preservation are eventually incompatible (see Solow, 1974; Stokey, 1998). Recently, a
new interest is growing about the implications of tourism activity on both the economic and environmental
performances, since “Having grown faster than world GDP since the 1950s, international tourism is today
one of the most important tradeable sectors, with expenditure on tourist goods and services representing some
8% of total world export receipts and 5% of world GDP” (Lanza et al., 2003). Tourism, as any other human
activity, is based on a deep and complex bilateral relationship with the surrounding environment, which
affects and is affected by tourists’ inflows (Budowski, 1976). On the one hand, environmental assets are a
fundamental determinant of tourists’ destination choice and, on the other hand, tourism has negative effects
on the environment (Davies and Cahill, 2000). Many poor and developing countries still have abundant
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natural resources which give them a sort of natural advantage in the production of tourism services. It is
thus important to understand how to optimally manage tourism activities in order to promote a smooth
process of economic development.
In this framework, the notion of sustainability has become particularly popular lately. Since the Brundt-
land’s report, which firstly introduced the definition of sustainable development, one of the top priorities for
policymakers and researchers is looking for, among others, that specific pathway which satisfies “the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED,
1987). Similarly, the necessity of addressing the development of different economies along a sustainable
tourism path has been pointed out by several studies (see, among others, Pigram, 1990; Dearden, 1991).
An appropriate definition of sustainable tourism is “tourism which meets the needs of present tourists and
host regions while protecting and enhancing opportunity for the future” (WTO, 1993). Thus, by combining
with the Budowski’s (1976) symbiosis scenario1, it refers to a certain type of tourism that wisely uses and
preserves natural resources in order to maintain their long-term viability and thus their capacity to produce
welfare services to tourists, and humans in general. Essentially, sustainable tourism involves the minimiza-
tion of its negative impacts on the environment (and eventually the maximization of its positive impacts on
the economic development). Serious concerns in the tourism literature about the real possibility of reaching
and implementing a sustainable tourism pathway exist (Casagrandi and Rinaldi, 2002). In this paper, we
attempt to contribute to this debate by adopting a macroeconomic point of view, and in particular an eco-
nomic growth standpoint, focusing on the economic incentives for tourism firms to engage in environmental
protection activities.
The main question we wish to answer in this paper is whether it is possible for an economy specialized
in tourism to achieve long-run growth, ensuring that its natural resources are used sustainably. From an
economic point of view, the issue is particularly relevant if we consider that many developing countries
endowed with natural resources, as pristine beaches, beautiful mountains, undisturbed wildlife and a rich
biodiversity mix, are now facing the choice between mass-tourism and green-tourism. Some examples are
the Caribbean, Indian Ocean and south Pacific islands, which every year are chosen as holiday destinations
by an increasing number of tourists worldwide; the implications of the choices of these countries, mainly
through the channel of climate change, are going to have not only a local impact on their ecosystems and
natural assets but also on vast surrounding areas (the entire Caribbean Gulf, the whole Indian and Pacific
Oceans) leading to potentially tremendous impacts on the welfare of a large share of people worldwide. A
satisfactory answer to our question cannot be found in the existing literature, since existing works either
separately address the relationship between tourism and growth (Hazari and Sgro, 1995; Lanza and Pigliaru,
2000; Lanza et al., 2003; Brau et al., 2007) or the linkage between tourism and the environment (Candela
and Cellini, 2006; Cerina, 2007; Giannoni and Maupertuis, 2007; Lozano et al., 2008).
The literature on tourism and growth is mostly empirical, and concludes that tourism specialization is
to a large extent successful. From the theoretical side, most of the papers focus on dynamic models of trade,
and the general conclusion is that, as long as tourism demand increases by a higher rate than world income,
a terms of trade effect determines whether tourism and growth move in the same direction (Hazari and Sgro,
1995). Since tourism demand shows a low elasticity of substitution (Brau et al., 2007; Lanza et al., 2003),
tourism is beneficial for growth if the international terms of trade move in favor of tourism services (see
recently Schubert et al., 2011). On the empirical side, several works analyze the implications of tourism on
the growth performance of different economies during the last decades of the XX century. Lanza et al. (2003)
show that even in developed countries the effect can be positive, despite the fact that productivity growth
in tourism is lower than in other sectors. Brau et al. (2007), by considering the time period 1980-2003,
show that tourism countries grow significantly faster than others, including OECD, oil exporters, developing
economies and small countries. Also Lanza and Pigliaru (2000) confirm this result by underlining that in
1Budowsky (1976) critically discusses whether tourist flows lead to degradation or enhancement of the environment, and he
claims that three types of interrelation between tourism and environment can exist: conflict, coexistence or symbiosis.
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the period 1985-1995 seven of the fifteen fastest growing countries are tourism countries, and that what
matters for the ability of a country to successfully specialize in tourism is its relative endowment of natural
resources, rather than its absolute size; in fact, a relevant and large share of fast growing tourism countries
are small countries, and to a large extent small islands (Antigua and Barbuda, Cyprus, Maldives, Mauritius,
Seychelles, Singapore and St Kitts and Nevis).
The tourism and environment literature, instead, mainly develops alternative theoretical frameworks to
study the long-run effects of tourism on the natural assets of tourism destinations. From the empirical point
of view, Tisdell (2001) points out that environmental resources, on the one hand, positively affect tourists’
preferences towards a particular location and, on the other hand, are negatively affected by tourist inflows.
Davies and Cahill (2000) show that tourism has large impacts on the environment, comprising energy and
water consumption, production of waste, effects on water and air quality, alteration and fragmentation of
ecosystems and impacts on wildlife and on aesthetic and cultural environment. From the theory perspective,
Candela and Cellini (2006) adopt a microeconomic approach by analyzing a differential game where tourism
destinations compete in an oligopolistic market by choosing how much to invest in environmental preservation
and differentiation efforts. Giannoni and Maupertuis (2007) employ a dynamic model focusing on the trade-
off between investments in tourism infrastructure and their impact on environmental quality. The paper most
close to ours is Cerina’s (2007), which develops a tractable framework (which we shall borrow to a large
extent) for analyzing the implications between residents’ choices (about consumption and environmental
preservation efforts) and tourism demand and flows, and their joint effects on the environment. The model
however abstracts completely from capital accumulation and economic growth results to be completely
exogenous; moreover, the pollution abatement effort is also exogenous and thus environmental dynamics
turns out to be trivial. Our paper seeks to improve these shortcomings by elaborating a more detailed
macroeconomic sector useful to present some policy insights. In particular, we allow for the economic and
environmental growth rates of the tourism economy to be endogenous as resulting from agents’ choices about
consumption levels and environmental preservation efforts. Lozano et al. (2008) take a first step in this
direction, by introducing capital accumulation along with the provision of public goods and services by the
government, but their model turns out to be so complex that no analytical solution can be found and thus
no policy implications can be inferred.
In tourism studies, much attention is placed on the concept of tourism area life cycle introduced by Butler
(1980), which claims that “a tourism destination experiences several stages of development that eventually
end in stagnation. These stages are differentiated by several factors, such as the number of visitors, tourists’
motivations, the residents’ perception of the tourism phenomenon, or the degree of environmental damage”
(Lozano et al., 2008). According to such a hypothesis, in order for tourism activity to be sustainable we
need alternate phases of high and low visitor numbers permitting ecosystems to regenerate. Note that in
developing economies depending on tourism, since income to a large extent depends on tourism profits, this
may imply dramatic welfare consequences. It is therefore crucial for the wellbeing of local communities to
find a sustainable tourism pathway allowing for a smooth development process. In this paper, we argue
that such an outcome is possible, as long as tourism firms allocate some resources to reduce the adverse
impact of tourism on the environment; this might happen because long-term profits from tourism represent
an important stimulus for engaging in environmental protection activities that support the ecosystem’s own
regeneration capacity and lead to green growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our baseline dynamic general equilibrium model
with main focus on economies specialized in tourism, where crowding averse tourists are attracted by the
quality of environmental assets and by the stock of tourism facilities available in the economy2. The resident
household-firm agent has to determine how to manage the trade-off between developing tourism facilities and
preserving environmental quality, by deciding how much to invest in tourism services and in environmental
2Note that in the paper the terms environmental assets, environmental quality and natural resources are used as synonyms.
Similarly, the terms tourism facilities and tourism capital (or simply capital) are interchangeable.
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protection activities. In Section 3 we analyze the steady state outcome, and we show that the economy
lies at any instant of time on its sustainable balanced growth path equilibrium, along which consumption,
income and environmental quality grow at constant rates. Tourists’ preferences determine its economic and
environmental growth rate, and in particular greener (greyer) preferences lead to better (worse) economic
and environmental performances. Section 4 presents an interpretation of the model, which best suits in
describing the challenges faced by small island countries, as those populating the Caribbean, the Indian and
the south Pacific Ocean. Small economies are characterized by the “luxury of limited choice” (Persaud, 2011),
which means they do not have any choice but exploiting their comparative advantages, which are the drivers
of tourist inflows. Section 5 considers two straightforward extensions of the model to allow for tourists’
demand to be also affected by the provision of public goods by the government or other local authorities,
and for a richer tourist flows function depending not only on environmental quality but also on human-built
facilities. We show that even in these two contexts, the qualitative results will not be substantially different
from our baseline model, meaning that it is a good benchmark for the analysis of tourism activities on
both the economic and environmental sides of small tourism-based economies. In Section 6 we present some
concluding remarks and propose directions for future research. Appendix A contains the equilibrium and
transitional dynamics analysis of our detrended system of differential equations, for both the baseline and
extended models.
2 The Baseline Model
The model is a Ramsey-type (1928) optimal growth model, where the (resident) household-firm agent seeks
to maximize its welfare given the resource constraints and initial conditions. In order to maintain the model
tractable and simple, we adopt the framework developed in Cerina (2007) to describe the international
tourism market and tourists’ preferences. As in Xepapadeas (2005), we consider environmental quality as
a stock variable, while pollution flows can be abated through purposive and costly activities; emissions
abatement costs are assumed to be convex as in Bartz and Kelly (2008). Finally, for the sake of simplicity,
tourism inflows are proportional to environmental quality.
2.1 International Tourism Market and Tourist Preferences
As in Cerina (2007), we consider a small economy producing only tourism services (accommodation, restau-
rants, leisure facilities...), supplied in an international tourism market populated by a large number of
tourism economies. The produced tourism services need to be interpreted as a bundle of goods and services
able to satisfy a wide range of tourism needs. About the nature of the international tourism market, we
should consider that “although international competition fixes the price for a given quality of the services,
a country could charge a higher price provided its services are considered of a higher quality (that is, char-
acterized by a higher stock of environmental, cultural and social resources) than other countries. In other
words, the international market consists of a continuum of tourism markets differentiated by their quality
and the (equilibrium) price paid for the tourism services. In each of them, the suppliers are price-takers,
but they can move along the quality ladder due to changes in their environmental quality.” (Cerina, 2007).
The tourists flow comes from the international market and thus there is no distinction between resident and
non-resident tourists.
The international demand for tourism is infinite at the price level corresponding to tourists’ willingness
to pay and nil for any other price level. As a consequence, at equilibrium the quantity of tourism is totally
determined by the supply side3, which is composed by a large number of household-firm producing tourism
services. With respect to Cerina (2007), who assumes that tourists’ preferences depend on the quality of
3This is obviously a strong simplification of reality. However, introducing also a demand side in such a dynamic context
would complicate dramatically the model, and it would no longer be possible to obtain analytical solutions.
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the environment, et, and the number of tourists itself, zt, we assume
4 that they depend also on the stock of
tourism facilities, kt. By relying on Rosen’s (1974) hedonic pricing theory (see Cerina, 2007), the willingness
to pay for tourism services is given by:
pt = p(kt, et, zt) = ak
α
t e
φ
t z
−µ
t , (1)
where a > 0 is a scale parameter, 0 < α, φ < 1 measure the degree of tourists’ sympathy towards tourism
facilities and environment, respectively, while µ ∈ R determines their degree of crowding aversion. It
is reasonable to assume that the better the quality of tourism facilities and environment, the better the
tourism experience, and therefore the higher the willingness to pay for the service. Since φ and α quantify
the magnitude of tourists’ passion for natural and human-built goods, we shall interpret them as the ‘green’
and ‘grey’ preference parameters, respectively. The assumption 0 < α, φ < 1 states that, reasonably, the
willingness to pay for tourism services is increasing and concave in kt and et. It is not so obvious what the
relationship between the willingness to pay and tourism intensity should be. Tourists could be crowding
averse (µ > 0), crowding indifferent (µ = 0) or crowding lover (µ < 0). In order to allow for different types
of preferences with respect to crowd, we do not attach a priory any restriction on the sign of µ itself5. Each
tourist buys one unit of tourism services such that output is measured in terms of tourist entries. Tourism
revenues are then:
yt = p(kt, et, zt)zt = ak
α
t e
φ
t z
1−µ
t . (2)
2.2 Environmental Quality and Residents Behavior
As in Xepapadeas (2005), environmental quality is a stock variable, whose dynamics depends on the difference
between its regeneration (or pollution absorption) capacity, r(et), and unabated pollution, bt: e˙t = r(et)−bt.
As in Marsiglio (2011), we assume that the environmental regeneration capacity is unbounded, r′(et) > 0,
and for the sake of simplicity it is a linear function of the environmental quality, r(et) = ret, where r > 0
measures its natural rate of regeneration. As in Cerina (2007) and Lozano et al. (2008), pollution, xt, is
assumed to be a by-product of tourism activities (consistently with Budowsky’s, 1976, conflict scenario),
xt = dzt, where d > 0 measures the degree of pollution intensity. However, the tourism economy (the
household-firm) may undertake costly abatement activities, which reduce the amount of pollution to utxt,
where 0 < ut < 1 denotes the fraction of emission abated, such that unabated emissions result to be
bt = (1− ut)xt. Given these assumptions, the law of motion of the environment reads as:
e˙t = ret − d(1− ut)zt. (3)
Residents are characterized as traditional macroeconomic household-firm agents, who own the firms and
rent their (tourism) capital to such firms in order to produce tourism services. The size of the household
is normalized to 1 for the sake of simplicity. Its lifetime welfare is given by the infinite discounted (ρ > 0
is the pure rate of time preference) sum of the instantaneous utilities, assumed to be isoelastic in the only
argument, the consumption level, ct, u(ct) =
c1−σt −1
1−σ , where σ > 1 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
4Cerina (2007) emphasizes that many factors affect tourism preferences; in particular, “... a foreign visitor obtains satisfaction
from a number of different sources, such as: (a) the quality and quantity of services supplied by private tourist operators
(accommodation, restaurants, leisure facilities); (b) the quality and quantity of public goods provided by local authorities (public
transport, information, safety); (c) the quality and quantity of environmental (amenities, countryside, beaches, mountains,
parks, climate), cultural (traditional festivals and events, typical food, historical buildings, museums) and social (people, general
atmosphere, curious attractions) resources; and (d) the degree of availability and enjoyment derived from public goods and cultural
and environmental amenities, which is highly correlated to and negatively influenced by the aggregate number of visitors”. Note
that, apart from public goods, our model includes all such factors. In a later section of the paper, we shall also introduce a
government with the goal of providing public goods and services, showing that our results will not be qualitatively different.
5However, a restriction on the sign µ will be imposed later on in order to ensure sufficiency of the optimal control problem.
In particular, we shall need the degree of crowding aversion to be positive.
5
of substitution (assumed to be greater than unity, as standard in growth theory). Its problem consists of
choosing how much to consume given the income it receives by producing tourism services, yt, and how
much to invest in tourism services, k˙t. Since its revenues depend on environmental quality, which positively
affects tourist preferences (and willingness to pay) and allows its firm to move along the quality ladder of
the international tourism market, it has also to determine how much to invest in environmental protection
activities. The cost of emissions abatement is c(ut)yt. The household-firm problem reads as follows:
max
ct,ut
W =
∫ ∞
0
c1−σt − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt (4)
s.t. k˙t = [1− c(ut)] yt − ct
e˙t = ret − d(1− ut)zt,
together with given initial conditions, k0 and e0. It is reasonable to assume that the cost function is increasing
and convex, c′(ut) > 0 and c′′(ut) > 0, meaning that it gets more and more costly to abate larger shares of
emissions (Candela and Cellini, 2006; and Bartz and Kelly, 2008). As in Bartz and Kelly (2008), the cost
function is assumed to take the following suitable form:
c(ut) = 1− (1− ut) (5)
with  > 1. Such a specification results to be very convenient since it permits to simplify dramatically the
following analysis, allowing for an explicit analytical solution.
2.3 Tourism and General Equilibrium
Since our main concern is related to the effects of tourism on the environment of the accommodating
destination, we need to specify the relationship between the tourist flows and the domestic economy. For
the sake of simplicity6, we assume that the tourist flow is proportional to environmental quality:
zt = vet, (6)
where v > 0 is a parameter determining the intensity of such a relationship. According to (6), tourist
flows are limited to a certain proportion of the stock of environmental assets, as the availability of beaches
or other natural amenities (i.e. a certain amount of square meters per tourist). If environmental quality
increases over time tourism increases while if environmental quality decreases tourism falls. Under such an
assumption, the dynamic problem of the household-firm agent can be recast as7:
max
ct,ut
W =
∫ ∞
0
c1−σt − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt (7)
s.t. k˙t = (1− ut)Akαt eθt − ct (8)
e˙t = ret − η(1− ut)et, (9)
where A = av1−µ, θ = 1+φ−µ and η = dv. In this framework, it is reasonable to assume that r < η, meaning
that in the case of no abatement activity, ut = 0, environmental quality gets worse and worse. In such a
6The assumption will be removed later on, when we consider that tourist flows are also related to the stock of tourism
facilities (as in Giannoni and Maupertuis, 2007). Since the qualitative results of the baseline model still hold even in more
detailed frameworks (see section 5), we believe it is worthy to present the model first in its simplest form.
7Note that the structure of the economy allows to obtain a model of tourism directly comparable to traditional models
of economic growth. In particular, the model can be directly read as a Uzawa (1965) - Lucas (1988) type growth model
where tourism facilities and environmental resources represent physical and human capital, respectively. Differently from the
standard Uzawa-Lucas model, in our framework income (output) rather than input (share of human capital) is used to reallocate
resources between sectors. The allocation of a certain amount of income to environmental preservation activities ensures that
(under particular conditions) the growth rate of natural resources is strictly positive, and thus the environment turns out to be
the engine of growth.
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scenario, the environmental growth rate would be negative, and in the long-run it will lead environmental
quality to become so poor to be no longer appealing for tourists, who will then divert their demand to other
destinations, completely canceling the profits of the tourism sector. However, if the abatement activity is
excessive, ut = 1, environmental quality will grow according to its regeneration capacity, but this will require
allocating all the income from tourism to such activities and no resources will be left for consumption. These
two extreme situations are clearly not optimal for our household-firm agent, and thus we expect that the
optimal solution will show a strictly positive and strictly lower than unity share of abated emissions.
Sufficiency of the above problem needs that α + θ < 1, requiring the crowding aversion parameter to
be sufficiently large, that is α + φ < µ. This rules out the crowding indifferent (µ = 0) and crowding
lover (µ < 0) cases. From now onward, we shall assume that this condition holds, along with that ensuring
θ > 0, that is we shall assume that the crowding aversion parameter is positive and lies in a certain range,
α+φ < µ < 1+φ. Household-firm maximization yields to the following dynamic equations for consumption
and share of abated pollution:
c˙t
ct
=
1
σ
[
α(1− ut)Akα−1t eθt − ρ
]
(10)
− u˙t
1− ut =
1
− 1
[
θ(− 1)η

(1− ut)− θr + αct
kt
]
. (11)
Equation (10) is the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule for consumption and states that consumption growth
increases with the income to tourism capital ratio ( ytkt ) and decreases with the rate of time preference.
Equation (11) says instead that the growth rate of the share of unabated emissions increases with the share
of unabated emissions and the consumption to tourism capital ratio ( ctkt ), while it decreases with the rate of
environmental regeneration.
3 BGP Analysis
We now focus on the steady state outcome of our model economy, which is characterized by a balanced
growth path (BGP) equilibrium, that is a path along which all the variables grow at constant rates. At
equilibrium, it is clear from equations (8) and (10) that the growth rate of tourism capital and consumption
must be equal in order to have long-run growth, γ ≡ γc = γk = γyα+θ . Moreover, from (11), the share of
abated emissions needs to constant. It is therefore possible to show that along the BGP the growth rates of
the economy, γ, and the environment, γe, are constant and positive.
Proposition 1. Assume ρθ < r <
θη[1−α+(σ−1)]−(1−α)ρ
θ(σ−1) . Then, the following results hold:
(i) Along the BGP, the share of unabated emission is constant and equal to:
1− u = [(σ − 1)θr + (1− α)ρ]
θη[1− α+ (σ − 1)] ∈ (0, 1), (12)
while the economic and environmental growth rates are strictly positive and respectively given by:
γ =
θr − ρ
1− α+ (σ − 1) , (13)
γe =
1− α
θ
γ. (14)
(ii) The BGP is the only (non-trivial) viable equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
The technical condition ρθ < r <
θη[1−α+(σ−1)]−(1−α)ρ
θ(σ−1) in Proposition 1 is required in order to ensure that
the growth rates are positive and that 0 < 1−u < 1. The BGP results to be locally unstable, and therefore the
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only possibility for our model economy to show balanced growth (to reach its non-trivial steady state) is to lie
on such a path at any point in time. We can see that the growth rate of environmental quality is proportional
to the economic growth rate, and they both depend positively on the rate of environmental regeneration and
negatively on the rate of time preference. The intuition behind this result is clear: an increase in the rate
of regeneration improves environmental quality (independently on agents effort in abatement activities) and
therefore increases tourism, which determines resident agents’ income; an increase in the the rate of time
preference increases the opportunity-cost of investments and therefore lowers the incentives to abatement
activities.
It is straightforward to note that the BGP equilibrium is sustainable since it is associated with increasing
consumption (and therefore welfare) and cleaner environment (Brock and Taylor, 2010). This allows all the
current and future generations to enjoy the benefits of economic development: larger consumption levels are
experienced along with better environmental quality (WECD, 1998). Tourism itself results to be sustainable
too, since (present and future) tourists’ demand is satisfied and host region needs are met. In fact, tourist
flows are increasing over time since environmental quality improves, and this allows the tourism economy
to proceed its development along a green direction; see equation (6). This result highlights that sustainable
tourism is possible and, contrarily to Butler’s (1980) view, the development of tourism destinations does not
have to end up in stagnation in the long-run. Alternate phases of high and low tourism will not be necessary
to allow ecosystem regeneration, as long as the household-firm actively engages in environmental preservation
activities which support natural assets renewal capacity. Since growth and environmental quality move in
the same direction, a smooth development process, founded on environmental-based tourism activities, is
not simply an utopia, but a concrete possibility.
These results suggest that international tourism competition can play an important role in promoting
green growth. What really matters for this result to hold is that such a competition is driven by tourists’
green preferences, which spur the residents’ willingness to invest in abatement activities. Tourism, and in
particular the nature of tourists’ preferences, is the source of the economic incentives leading to the BGP
outcome. Since tourists are attracted by greener locations, their demand triggers residents’ investment in
abatement activities which, by improving environmental quality, generates long run growth. Since tourists
play a determinant role for such an outcome to arise, it is crucial to understand how their preferences affect
the BGP. This can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2. Along the BGP, the economic and environmental growth rates are positive functions of the
tourists’ green preference parameter (φ), while they are negative functions of the grey preference (α) and
crowding aversion (µ) parameters.
Proof. The result is immediate by differentiating (13) and (14) with respect to θ (remembering that
θ = 1 + φ− µ increases with φ and decreases with µ) and α. 
Proposition 2 emphasizes how tourists, with their own preferences, lead a tourism economy to a better
or worse outcome in terms of economic and environmental performances. This suggests that (tourists’)
environmental education can be crucially successful and may be needed to improve the economic and envi-
ronmental growth rates of several economies worldwide. In particular, education policies aimed at improving
the passion of tourists for remote, untouched and environmental-friendly destinations, or lowering their pas-
sion for highly urbanized and metropolitan areas or for crowded localities will be beneficial for the whole
economic-environmental system of tourism destinations. While the effects of the former two kinds of policy
are obvious, the latter deserves some explanation. The crowding aversion parameter determining the sym-
pathy of tourists for the presence of other visitors has important implications on the revenues of the tourism
sector. Basically, a stronger crowding aversion decreases tourism revenues since tourists are less willing to
visit popular destinations and therefore lowers the incentives for residents to invest in abatement activities,
which will eventually result in further reductions in tourist flows. Being successful in lowering crowding
8
aversion will allow to get rid of this perverse mechanism generating a vicious circle8.
A different interpretation is related to the kind of tourism such preferences would imply. Larger values
of α are associated to mass-tourism, while larger values of φ are associated to green-tourism. Indeed, on the
one hand, a higher grey preference parameter implies that tourists’ interest is mainly linked to human-built
facilities and thus not much concerned about environmental problems, while, on the other hand, a higher
value of the green preference parameter means that tourists place more value on environmental assets and
wish to enjoy more natural amenities. Since the destination may hypothetically choose which type of visitors
to attract (through different marketing strategies), these parameters can be read as policy instruments. From
this perspective, Proposition 2 states that policy measures fostering the development of green-tourism are
beneficial to both the economic performance and environmental quality, while other measures promoting
mass-tourism are harmful for both the economy and the environment. Thus, if tourism needs to be the
strategy for long-term development, green-tourism measures have to be encouraged and supported.
4 Tourism in Small Island Countries
The model works well in describing the experience of small economies, in particular small island economies,
where tourism is the main source of economic activity. Some examples are south Pacific, Indian and
Caribbean islands, which, because of their location, their natural endowment and their remoteness, keep
struggling to develop an efficient economy, based on agriculture or manufacturing. In these countries, how to
manage the trade-off between natural amenities and tourism facilities is an important question and problem.
In fact, two competing forces exacerbates the matter: from one side, the desire to attract more tourists who
bring and spend their resources in the country, allowing substantial increases in the national income, would
push for constructing new facilities in order to accommodate their needs; from the other side, the necessity
to tackle environmental problems, which represent a delicate issue in these countries9 and can be stressed
by tourism activities, would operate in favor of limiting the number of tourists.
Small countries in general, and small island countries in particular, face additional challenges in their de-
velopment process with respect to larger countries. Because of the difficulty in achieving sufficient economies
of scale in a wide variety of basic economic activities, tourism is an important strategy to overcome their
smallness. It provides the volume to whelm insufficient market demand, it increases competition by encour-
aging new entrants in the local market and raise the standard of livings of the local population (Croes, 2006).
Persaud (2011), by analyzing the development and growth opportunities of Caribbean countries, develops
a Ricardian argument that can be equally applied to other small economies, such as the Pacific and Indian
island countries. He claims that these countries have the “luxury of limited choice”, in the sense that being
so small they do not have alternatives to improve their welfare but to exploit their comparative advantage.
In fact, the size of these economies often does not allow them to be competitive with big countries, neither
in the manufacturing (China and India) or the agricultural (Australia and Brazil) sectors. However, they
are endowed with significant natural resources, tropical weather and pristine beaches which make them
interesting and desired tourism locations. For these economies, tourism is a crucial and often predomi-
nant component of the national welfare, thus determining how dealing with increasing tourism demand and
tourist needs is a survival matter. Moreover, tourism is often seen by local policymakers as the obvious,
or even the only, way to reach economic development (Crusol et al., 1989). The luxury of limited choice
8The result that education can be an important vehicle to make people’s, and tourists’ in particular, preferences and behavior
greener is consistent with several studies in educational psychology (see, among others, Orams and Hill, 1998). These studies
lend support to our conclusion that environmental education deserves greater emphasis in tourism (and more broadly speaking,
in environmental) management issues.
9Climate change is a great challenge for small islands all around the world. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(2007) identifies Tuvalu, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands in the Pacific and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean as key sites vulnerable
to the sea-level rise resulting from climate change.
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would mainly consist of focusing on the management of the trade-off, often experienced in industrialized
economies, between economic development and environmental preservation10.
However, tourism does not need to be perceived as a panacea (Commonwealth Secretariat and World
Bank, 2000) and its effect on local population’s wellbeing is not obvious and could even be harmful. In-
deed, tourism specialization, especially in small countries, could generate several types of perverse effects
(dependence on foreign capital, inflation, market labor disturbances, Dutch disease effect, land competition,
low-education trap). The recent experience of the Caribbean islands, where first signs of deterioration of
tourism success have arisen, is an example of how compelling is the need to manage tourism development.
After decades of success, recent trends show that the Caribbean region receives more customers, who spend
less and less in the host economy, and in the long-run this could even hamper the development process to
continue smoothly. In fact, an increasing number of tourists spending less money in the tourism destination
exacerbates the negative (environmental pressure) and alleviate the positive (economic stimulus) aspects of
tourism. De Albuquerque and McElroy (1992), even twenty years ago, suggest that long-run tourism viabil-
ity in the region requires several islands to adopt a sustainable approach to tourism, following Bermuda’s
example where the government limits total arrivals to a maximum sustainable annual level. Maloney and
Montes Rojas (2001) argue that the outcome in the Caribbean region is a consequence of mass-tourism,
which has extensively introduced “all inclusive” packages and price competition.
The phase of tourism in several Caribbean islands has reached the maturity stage, according to Butler’s
(1980) life-cycle model (De Albuquerque and McElroy, 1992), and developing an alternative tourism strategy
can be extremely costly. However, their experience should serve as a warning for other tourism economies
worldwide, especially those still in earlier stages of the life-cycle model, on the possible effects of lacking a
long-term perspective in planning tourism development. The Indian and south Pacific islands, where the
contribution of tourism to GDP is a much lower share than Caribbean islands’ (WTTC, 2012), are still
in a phase of emergence and discovery, probably because of the relatively higher travel costs from highly
populated rich countries (Europe and North America). From the Caribbean lesson, they should learn that
mass-tourism has large positive effects only in the short-term while in the long-run it could be associated
with excessive (environmental) costs. Wilkinson (1989) firstly suggests that mass-tourism cannot be a long-
term solution for small islands and there exist alternative actions to develop long-term sustainable tourism,
balancing the competing economic and environmental pressures11. The theoretical framework we develop is
consistent with Wilkinson’s (1989) view and confirms his claim that alternative pathways to tourism, ending
up in long-run growth, environmental improvement and welfare gains, do exist.
5 Extensions
In this section we consider two straightforward extensions of the model in order to allow for the governmen-
tal provision of public services (as suggested by Cerina, 2007) and a more realistic tourists flow function
(Giannoni and Maupertuis, 2007). We show that the qualitative results will not be substantially different
in these contexts, and thus our baseline model represents a good benchmark for the analysis of tourism
activities on both the economic and environmental sides of tourism destinations.
10Persaud’s (2011) words clearly emphasize this reasoning: “Where countries are physically small and tourism is a large
component of the economy, it is critical to invest in preserving and enriching the natural, constructed and social environment.
There is no space to waste in a small state. Islands that are dependent on tourism disregard, at their peril, issues such as coastal
management, water runoffs, waste management and social issues that keep tourists away drugs, crime, corruption and general
lawlessness”.
11Wilkinson (1989) stresses that while tourism, because of its nature, always results in some environmental change, the route
to environmental damage is not predetermined and alternative, eventually less-damaging, options exist. In this direction goes
his view that tourism firms need to treat environmental protection as an “internality”, that is as a cost of doing business.
10
5.1 Government and the Provision of Public Services
As Cerina (2007) underlines, tourists’ preferences may be also positively affected by the provision of public
goods, such as transport, information and safety. In order to allow for this possibility, we now assume that
a government or local authority levies proportional taxes on the household-firm agent’s income in order to
provide such kinds of goods and services. If the government wishes to maintain a balanced budget, its public
spending, gt will be equal to the tax revenues, τyt, at any time: gt = τyt, where τ is the tax rate. Tourists’s
preferences and willingness to pay can be rewritten as:
pt = bk
ψ1
t g
ψ2
t e
ψ3
t z
−ψ4
t , (15)
where ψ1, ψ3, ψ4 are the tourists’ preference parameter with respect to tourism services, environmental
quality and number of tourists. It seems reasonable to assume that tourists obtain satisfaction also by
the quality and quantity of public services provided by local authorities (Cerina, 2007); thus, the term
0 < ψ2 < 1 measures tourists’ sympathy towards public services and we suppose that the willingness to pay
for tourism services is increasing and concave in gt. By inserting gt = τyt into (15), and plugging this into
the household-firm’s income, we can recast residents’ income from tourism activities as:
yt = ak
α
t e
φ
t z
1−µ
t , (16)
where a = b
1
1−ψ2 τ
ψ2
1−ψ2 , α = ψ11−ψ2 , φ =
ψ3
1−ψ2 and 1− µ =
1−ψ4
1−ψ2 . Note that the expression for income in (16)
is exactly equivalent to (2). It is therefore obvious that all the previous results (Propositions 1 and 2) still
hold, as long as ψ11+(σ−1) < 1 − ψ2 < (1+ψ3−ψ4)rρ , which ensures that the growth rates of consumption and
environmental quality are strictly positive along the BGP. In particular, it is possible to stress the following
result:
Proposition 3. Along the BGP, the economic and environmental growth rates are independent of the tax
rate (τ) used to provide public services, and they positively depend on the tourists’ public service preference
parameter (ψ2).
Proof. Note that in this framework the economic and environmental growth rates are respectively given by:
γ = (1+ψ3−ψ4)r−(1−ψ2)ρ[1+(σ−1)](1−ψ2)−ψ1 and γe =
1−ψ1−ψ2
1+ψ3−ψ4γc. The result is immediate by differentiating these expressions
with respect to A = av1−µ = b
1
1−ψ2 τ
ψ2
1−ψ2 v1−µ and ψ2. About ∂γe∂ψ2 , a sufficient condition for this derivative
to be monotonic (and positive) is that ψ1 + ψ2 < 1. 
The reason why the economic and environmental growth rates are not affected by the tax rate used
to finance public services is related to the fact that the government provides such services by subtracting
resources to the household-firm agent. This implies that the same resources that in the absence of government
intervention were used to provide tourism services would now be used to provide also public services. Since
these two type of tourism services are substitutable in tourists’ preferences and they do not affect the
environment (i.e., the engine of growth), the global effect on growth rates is null. The result that growth
rates increase with the public service preference parameter is not surprising and is consistent with the results
in Proposition 2.
5.2 Different Tourists Flow Function
Our baseline model is based on the simplifying assumption that tourist flows depend only on the stock of nat-
ural resources; see equation (6). This does not consider the eventual substitutability12 between Nature-made
12According to equation (6), tourist flows increase over time only if environmental quality increases too; a more realistic
situation is where, even if environmental quality does not change (or even falls), tourism inflows may rise because of increases
in the stock of tourism facilities.
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amenities (environmental stock) and human-built facilities (tourism capital stock). Similarly to Giannoni
and Maupertuis (2007) where the number of tourists monotonically rises both with the quality of the en-
vironment and quantity of tourism services, we now assume that tourist flows are determined by both the
stock of natural resources and tourism facilities through the following function:
zt = ve
δ
tk
λ
t , (17)
where δ, λ ∈ [0, 1] imply that (reasonably) tourism is increasing and concave in et and kt. Under (17), our
model can be recast as follows:
max
ct,ut
W =
∫ ∞
0
c1−σt − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt (18)
s.t. k˙t = (1− ut)Akβt eθt − ct (19)
e˙t = ret − η(1− ut)kλt eδt , (20)
where A = av1−µ, β = α + λ(1− µ), θ = φ + δ(1− µ) and η = dv. Provided that the conditions to ensure
sufficiency of such an optimization problem are met13, it is possible to show that a result pretty similar to
what derived in Proposition 1 holds.
Proposition 4. Assume r > θ+(1−δ)ρ. Then, the following results hold:
(i) Along the BGP, the economic and environmental growth rates are strictly positive and respectively given
by:
γ =
[θ + (1− δ)]r − ρ
1− β + (σ − 1 + λ) , (21)
γe =
1− β + λ
θ + (1− δ) γ. (22)
(ii) The BGP is the only (non-trivial) viable equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
The comments regarding Propositions 1 and 2 still apply also in this framework; note that in the case
δ = 1 and λ = 0 (such that β = α), the model is completely equivalent to our baseline specification and
thus the results are perfectly equivalent. However, in this case since tourist flows depend both on the stock
of natural and tourism assets, we are not able to determine explicitly what the share of unabated emissions
in steady state is, thus we are unable to provide an upper bound for r. Proposition 4 shows that even if
tourist flows allow for a substitutability between environmental and tourism capital stocks, a sustainable
BGP equilibrium can be found, and along such a path a smooth process of economic development and
environmental improvement occurs. As long as the household-firm agent engages in environmental protection
activities, a sustainable outcome for environmental-based tourism economies is possible.
6 Conclusion
Tourism, as any human activity, strongly affects and is affected by the environment. For countries highly
dependent on tourism, understanding how to regulate its development is a big question. We construct a
theoretical framework, where international tourists choose their holiday destination according to their pref-
erences for greenness, greyness and crowd while resident household-firm agents determine their effort in
environmental protection activities. Since tourism provides residents with incentives to engage in environ-
mental protection, the economy will reach a sustainable balanced growth path along which income, welfare
13By assuming that β < 1 and β + θ < 1 (the same conditions introduced in the baseline model), some additional conditions
are needed to ensure sufficiency. These are met if  is large enough, and at the same time β > λ and θ > δ.
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and environmental quality rise. This suggests that long-run sustainability of tourism is not an utopia, but it
requires a careful management of environmental assets. Thus, a carefully planned tourism sector can repre-
sent an important tool to promote green growth in several developing countries, where tourism contribution
to GDP may get larger and larger in the future.
In the debate on how to boost economic growth in developing countries, especially at a small country
level, policymakers often look at tourism development as the unique solution. In particular, in order to
raise revenues from tourism activities, they encourage mass-tourism. In their view, this would increase
income of the local population and thus its wellbeing. However, this view does not to take into account the
implications on natural resources, which are an important driver of worldwide tourists’ destination choice
and therefore can determine the eventual success in the long-run of any tourism activity. As Wilkinson
(1989) suggests, mass-tourism cannot be a solution for small developing island countries. In this paper
we provide a theoretical support to his argument, by showing that long-run tourism-based growth will be
possible if the preservation of natural resources is a main concern for local agents and worldwide tourists
have strong preferences for greener destinations. While the latter condition is to a large extent out of the
control of local policymakers, the former deserves special attention. Postponing environmental protection
to later stages of economic development can be an hazardous choice: if tourism specialization needs to be
the pathway to development, green-tourism needs to be promoted in order to ensure that the development
process will be smooth and sustainable.
Our results are obtained in a framework where tourist flows are endogenous, as a result of the resi-
dents’ choice on how much to consume and devote to environmental protection. Several studies relying
on the concept of carrying capacity point out that the number of tourists should be carefully controlled
(De Albuquerque and McElroy, 1992); thus a direct extension of the model would involve determining the
optimal number of tourists and analyzing its dynamic patterns. Other recent works analyze how uncertainty
affects economic decisions in multi-sector economic growth frameworks similar to ours (Marsiglio and La
Torre 2012a, 2012b), thus it would be also interesting to understand to what extent the degree of uncer-
tainty about tourist demand impacts on tourism revenues, tourism and natural assets. Finally, another
line of future research, probably most challenging, would consist of combining our results with a dynamic
model of trade (as Hazari and Sgro, 1995) in order to analyze whether and how terms of trade, growth and
environment affect one another. This is left for future research.
A Equilibrium and Stability Analysis
A.1 Baseline Model
By introducing χt =
ct
kt
and ϕt = k
α−1
t e
θ
t (1 − ut), we obtain the following reduced quasi-linear system of
differential equations:
χ˙t
χt
=
α− σ
σ
Aϕt + χt − ρ
σ
(23)
ϕ˙t
ϕt
= (α− 1)Aϕt + − 1 + α
− 1 χt −
θ
− 1r (24)
−u˙t
1− ut =
1
− 1
[
αχt +
θ(− 1)η

(1− ut)− θr
]
. (25)
Its steady state, found by setting (23), (24) and (25) equal to zero, is given by (χ, ϕ, 1− u), where:
χ =
θ(σ − α)r − (− 1)(1− α)ρ
α[1− α+ (σ − 1)] (26)
ϕ =
θσr − (− 1 + α)ρ
Aα[1− α+ (σ − 1)] (27)
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1− u = [(σ − 1)θr + (1− α)ρ]
θη[1− α+ (σ − 1)] . (28)
For ϕ to be positive we need that r > −1+αθσ ρ, while for χ to be positive we need r >
(−1)(1−α)
θ(σ−α) ρ. Since
 > 1, as long as r > −1+αθσ ρ holds the previous inequality is met. Note that 1 − u is positive with no
further parameter restrictions, and in order to be less than unity we need: r < θη[1−α+(σ−1)]−(1−α)ρθ(σ−1) . We
can now find the growth rate of consumption and environment at steady state, given by (13) and (14). For
both of them to be positive we need r > θρ, which also implies r >
−1+α
θσ ρ. For this set of parameter
restrictions to make sense, we need θη[1−α+(σ−1)]−(1−α)ρθ(σ−1) to be larger than

θρ, which requires η >

θρ. As
long as r < η, this last inequality is implied by r > θρ. Therefore the range of values for r is given by the
following expression: θρ < r <
θη[1−α+(σ−1)]−(1−α)ρ
θ(σ−1) .
We can study the stability property of the equilibrium (χ, ϕ, 1−u) by linearization. The Jacobian matrix
evaluated at steady state reads as:
J(χ, ϕ, 1− u) =
 χ −σ−ασ Aχ 0−1+α−1 ϕ −(1− α)Aϕ 0
α
−1(1− u) 0 θη (1− u)
 .
The stability properties of the system (23), (24), (25) depends on the number of positive and negative
eigenvalues of J(χ, ϕ, 1− u). We can explicitly find the three eigenvalues, which are given by:
λ1 =
θη

(1− u),
λ2,3 =
1
2
(
Γ±
√
Γ2 − 4Θ
)
,
where Γ = θη (1− u) > 0 and Θ = α(σ−1)+α(1−α)σ(−1) Aϕχ > 0. It is straightforward to note that λ1 is positive,
and λ2,3 have both positive real parts whatever the sign of the difference Γ
2 − 4Θ is, since Θ > 0. Since
all the eigenvalues have positive real parts, the equilibrium is locally unstable and therefore the only viable
(non-trivial) equilibrium for our model economy is to lie on its BGP equilibrium at any point in time.
A.2 Extended Model
The Euler equations for consumption and share of abated emissions for the problem (18), (19) and (20) are
given by:
c˙t
ct
=
1
σ
[
(β − λ)(1− ut)Akβ−1t eθt − ρ
]
− u˙t
1− ut =
1
− 1
[
θ

(− 1)η(1− ut)kφt eδ−1t + (δ − θ − 1)r − (λ− β)
ct
kt
− φ(− 1)(1− ut)Akβ−1t eθt
]
.
By introducing χt =
ct
kt
, ϕt = k
β−1
t e
θ
t (1− ut) and ψt = kλt eδ−1t (1− ut), we can analyze the following system
of differential equations:
χ˙t
χt
=
β − λ− σ
σ
Aϕt + χt − ρ
σ
(29)
ϕ˙t
ϕt
= (β − λ− 1)Aϕt + (1− φ) + β − 1
− 1 χt −
θ + (1− δ)
− 1 r (30)
ψ˙t
ψt
=
θ + (1− δ)

ηψt − θ + (1− δ)
− 1 r +
β − λ
− 1 χt. (31)
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Its equilibrium is given by (χ, ϕ, ψ), where:
χ =
(σ − β + λ)[θ + (1− δ)]r − (− 1)(1− β + λ)ρ
(β − λ)[1− β + (σ − 1 + λ)] (32)
ϕ =
σ[θ + (1− δ)]r − [(1− φ) + β − 1]ρ
A(β − λ)[1− β + (σ − 1 + λ)] (33)
ψ =
{(σ − 1)[θ + (1− δ)]r + (1− β + λ)ρ}
η[θ + (1− δ)][1− β + (σ − 1 + λ)] . (34)
The condition r > θ+(1−δ)ρ ensures that (χ, ϕ, ψ) > 0. The growth rate of consumption and environment are
respectively given by: γ = 1σ [(β − λ)Aϕ− ρ] and γe = r − ηψ; plugging (33) and (34) in these expressions
gives the BGP growth rates (21) and (22).
The Jacobian matrix of the previous system of differential equations evaluated at steady state is:
J(χ, ϕ, ψ) =
 χ
β−λ−σ
σ Aχ 0
(1−φ)+β−1
−1 ϕ (β − λ− 1)Aϕ 0
β−λ
−1 ψ 0
θ+(1−δ)
 ηψ
 .
Also in this case we can explicitly find its eigenvalues, which result to be:
λ1 =
θ + (1− δ)

ηψ,
λ2,3 =
1
2
(
Γ±
√
Γ2 − 4Θ
)
,
where Γ = θ+(1−δ) ηψ > 0 and Θ =
(β−λ)[1−β+(σ−1+λ)]
σ(−1) Aϕχ > 0. For the same argument discussed
in the baseline model, λ1 turns out to be positive, and λ2,3 to have both positive real parts. Since all
the eigenvalues have positive real parts, the equilibrium is locally unstable and therefore the only viable
(non-trivial) equilibrium for our model economy is to lie on its BGP equilibrium at any point in time.
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